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FEDERALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE
Chibli Mallatt
By addressing the topic of federalism in the Middle East, we could be
breaking new ground in an area where clearly old models failed, or are
failing before our eyes.
This is typically work in progress. Some of it is well established - and
is much better known than any observer can express it from without. Some
of it is in the making, in a way which is momentous in history. And some
of it is still farfetched, but may provide an inevitable horizon for societies
that are looking for conviviality by way of law.
Federalism is well known in its first, well-established dimension
thanks to the extraordinary tradition this country has known. It is less
known and is currently a big battle in progress in Europe. It is completely
unknown and is, I think, the intellectual battle to come in the Middle East.
So, these will be my three perspectives. Again, this is work in progress
because it forges itself out in media res, and requires some generosity
towards its fluid approximation sometimes, banal statements at other times,
and simply erroneous conclusions by way of evasive comparisons through a
single concept like federalism.
But first, it may be useful to offer a preliminary note of caution by
taking stock of the fact that federalism operates as a concept within a larger
non-legal and non-constitutional framework of societies, national and
international.
* Lecture given at Case Western Reserve University School of Law in February 7, 2002.
Despite the profound changes in the field since (new fundamental basic laws and
constitutions in the European Union 2003, Afghanistan 2003 and Iraq 2004), 1 have kept to
the original text of the lecture, introducing only minor changes. An updating would have
required a complete overhaul of the original lecture, which may be better appreciated it in its
original, prospective form. I am grateful to the editors of the CWRU Journal of International
Law for ascertaining quotes and references, and to Professor Hiram Chodosh who invited me
to address this difficult topic.
t Licence and Maitrise, Saint Joseph's University; L.L.M., Georgetown University; Ph.D.,
University of London. EU Jean Monnet Chair in European Law, St. Joseph's University,
Beirut, Lebanon (2001-present); Director, Centre for the Study of the European Union, St.
Joseph University, Beirut, Lebanon (2000-present); Director, Center of Islamic and Middle
Eastern Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (1992-
1996); Principal Attorney, Mallat Law Offices, Beirut, Lebanon. Author of numerous
articles and books, including THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW (Cambridge, 1993, paperback
2004), DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (in Arabic, Beirut, 2001) and THE MIDDLE EAST INTO THE
21ST CENTURY (London, 1996).
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I
The model in which federalism can be inscribed is ambitious, but is
particularly helpful as a common ground for all three societies. This model
is emerging for the analysis of society and states in the late 20th century
through the tripartite separation between the cultural (also called
ideological), the political (also dubbed juridical or legal), and the economic.
On that tripartite basis is projected either a unionist model or a separatist
one. When union is sought or defended, the lines examined follow the
tripartite analysis. When secession is envisaged or analyzed, the grid is
similarly divided into these three dominant prisms of the same object of
analysis - society within a state, and society within a transnational and
international system.
A detour helps ascertain the tripartite theory and its effectiveness,
which Fernand Braudel, the great French historian, offers in his Grammaire
des civilisations.I Its clearest theoretician in the late 20th century is another
Frenchman, Robert Fossaert, who is not well known, unfortunately, even in
his native France. This is partly because he secluded himself from the
whirlwinds of academic life to devote himself to research, which is as
ambitious as it is formidable. His summa in six volumes, called La Socitg
and published between 1977 and 1983, offers a clear and engaging journey
carried out in a spirit of unity, nuance, rigor and comprehensiveness.
Fossaert's approach offers a framework for each of the three sub-analytical
categories in the shape of a three-faced prism in which the study of society
is engaged. Society in the theory is singular, but it should and can be
observed analytically under each of those three facets. Each facet, in turn,
offers a full view of society as a whole with additional factors obtaining
from the interrelationship between the three facets within the given society
or state or in an international context. Some such factors could for instance
be the role of gender, or leadership. Another factor, which has been bearing
increasingly heavily on the nation state and society, is the so-called
globalization of the late 20th century. Ours presently is federalism.
Now, the models and the other factors in Fossaert's theory are also
dynamic. Any factor operates horizontally, and looks at society under three
facets. It is, also, both domestic and international. In addition, approaching
the same factor in its effect on the social, forces a looking at the subject
matter, society, along a historical continuum - that is, society as it goes
rather than as a simple snapshot arrested in time.
1 FERNAND BRAUDEL, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATIONS (Richard Mayne trans., 1994) (1987).
2 ROBERT FOSSAERT, LA SOCIETE (Paris: Editions du Seuil) (6 vols., 1977-1983). Two
further, separate books complete the study. ROBERT FOSSAERT, LE MONDE AU 21 EME
SIECLE (Paris: Fayard 1991), ROBERT FOSSAERT, L'AVENIR DU SOCIALISME (Paris:
Stock 1996). For more recent material, see http://www.macrosociologie.com.
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It is against this complex, but extremely effective model that the
reflection on federalism should be engaged both in terms of the Middle East
and in terms of Europe. In its construct, federalism is an alien concept
operating as a transversal construct affecting a number of states. The
construct sometimes simply does not exist as agreed legal-constitutional
set-up, but its programmatic projections are increasingly present whether
manifestly as the battleground of ideas and political positioning, as in
Europe, or sotto voce as a potential ground which is still looking for its
voices, as in the Middle East.
Federalism is the quintessential American invention. I have had
occasion to dwell on it recently in a work which was published in English
as a long series of newspaper articles which accompanied the 2000
presidential campaign in America, and appeared in book shape in Arabic in
August 2001. 3  It dwells on what makes America successful, its
achievements, but also its limitations, and concludes that the excellence of
law is one of the two distinctive features of pride for the American model -
the other being science. While this rooting in law is not particularly new to
an American audience, what one may not perceive as strongly from within
the US is how much the world has been Americanized in terms of law.
Laurence Tribe, in Constitutional Choices,4 summarized what he calls
the underlying political ideas of the American system into a list of six
categories: representative republicanism, federalism, separation of powers,
equality before the law, individual autonomy and procedural fairness.
America has shared many of these traits with other democracies for a long
time, but two constitutional features stand out on a world level as typically
American - federalism and the Supreme Court. The American people
deserve credit for both inventions which brought new dimensions to
democracy and the rule of law for the rest of the planet. Perhaps America
does not know it, but the world has been a consistently better place
wherever her two home-grown intellectual products have found anchor. In
contrast, and as further illustration to this point, federalism and the
protection of law by an independent supreme court appear as the two
missing ingredients for a peaceful and creative future in the many countries
and regions that do not know them.
Save for the Civil War, which unleashed exceptional violence over the
contours of power, the United States has indeed experimented peacefully
with federalism since 1787. Its basic staples include freedom of movement
for people and capital, and full faith and credit clauses for criminal and civil
cases. Its more difficult terrains are much more intertwined and much more
complex than the recognition of state jurisdiction and state decisions, or the
3 CHIBLI MALLAT, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2001). The chapters developed into the book
appeared serially in English in The Daily Star, and in Arabic in an-Nahar. The original
English series can be found at http://www.mallat.com.
4 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 25 (1985).
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inherent treatment of movement or investment in labor. More difficult and
complex terrain continues to be arbitrated by the federal courts two
centuries hence. For example, in Travis v. Reno,5 the Seventh Circuit
decided that Congress could prevent South Carolina from releasing data
gleaned from driver's license applications to third parties who might use
them to further their commercial interests. A few weeks later, the Supreme
Court ruled that the state of Massachusetts could not bar local companies
from doing business with a foreign country, in this case Myanmar, if
Congress had taken up the issue. These are simple, serendipitous
examples. In important and less important matters, federalism keeps getting
reinvented by the robust competition between individual states and by the
arbitration of a respected judiciary. Federalism is safe and secure in the
everyday practice of democracy in America.
The oft-repeated 1932 quote by Justice Brandeis is another alluring
characteristic of American federalism. The citation in his dissenting
opinion is well known: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country." 7 Replace "country" with "planet," and the global
answer follows. This takes us abroad, where the model is now being tested.
In its European dimension, federalism has been on the march since the
Treaty of Rome. 8 In its "Third world" dimension, federalism is inevitably
the shape of things to come within and between countries in the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, South America, and the luckier parts of Africa and the
former Soviet Union. Examples of federalism abound, of course, from
Malaysia to Nigeria. Where it is absent, as in the Middle East, it carries
much promise. In the same way a decent future for Iraq or Turkey can only
be federal within each country's borders, the emerging shape of Arab-Israeli
peace must consider, for long-term success, federalism's hard-to-adopt
central features of freedom of movement for business and labor. For
Europe, another essential feature of federalism is still wanting, hence, the
talk of the democratic deficit in the European Commission which stands in
the way of Europeans, in their ever-closer union decreed in the opening
passage of the founding Treaty of Rome in 1957.9 The details are daunting,
but that is the proper dimension of the federal common ground. That is,
even though the general patterns may well be established, there is always
need for the growing of barriers and qualifications between states and
between people living in different states. It is the ambiguity of federalism
5 Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000).
6 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
7 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
9 Id. preamble.
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and the extraordinary role the Supreme Court in the US, and the European
Court of Justice in the EU, grant to this ambiguity in their jurisprudence
that constitute the basic and fundamental condition of federalism across the
Transatlantic board. While the testing of new areas of conflict continues
more or less successfully in "an ever closer" Europe, the federal paradigm
is well entrenched as the measure of both achievement and shortcomings of
the European Union, as it has been for two centuries in the States of united
America.
The Supreme Court is the other great democratic improvement made
in America. But let us look at it here in its relationship with the concept of
federalism, as the ultimate arbitrator of the problems that might arise in the
application of the system. In short, alongside the common underlying
political ideas of most democracies, the concept of federalism and the
presence of the Supreme Court as the readily available recourse of the
citizen seeking his or her rights under the Constitution stand as the two
pillars of the matrix sought to forge ahead on the international scene.
The question, therefore, is how much of this federal experiment is
being knowingly or unknowingly processed now, in two great continents
generally described as the Middle East and Europe. I will start with Europe
because this is where the debate has been the most conscious and developed
over the past few years.
II
It is perhaps best to start with the end - with the Treaty of Nice, and
the way federalism was being developed to compensate for the most
dauntin dimension of European unionists, which is Europe's democratic
deficit. We face in Nice the reality of a shortcoming - the Treaty of Nice
did not meet the expectations of European federalists who were hoping to
establish it by the end of the intergovernmental conference in December
2000. Shortly after Nice, the European Commission tried to show good
will and treat Nice as if it was a success. Indeed, it was not. So Romano
Prodi, the president of the Commission, and Jean-Luc Dehaene, the
Commissioner who was in charge of institutional reform in Europe, dwelt
on what had been achieved in Nice as a rosy achievement: The
Commission, they explained soon after the Nice meeting came to an end,
would include twenty-seven to thirty areas in which a qualified majority,
rather than a complete consensus, is sufficient to decide. In these areas a
majority could prevail, and action would not be frustrated by the otherwise
consensual rule that has prevailed in Europe until then in these fields. At
the same time they argued that Nice was not an objective per se and that it
'0 Treaty of Nice, Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J.
(C 80) (2001).
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was only the means to prepare the ultimate historical objective to the ever
closer union in Europe.
On the more objectively successful achievement of Nice, they also
portrayed Nice as a moment of a revolutionary enlargement, underlining the
decision to open the Union up to another thirteen or fourteen member states
within a reasonable time frame, about ten years, and emphasizing that the
enlargement was taking place at the pace that would be acceptable for both
the European Court and the many countries that were seeking to join the
union. Still, everybody knows that in the bazaar-like bargaining that took
place in Nice, the states were still operating very much as selfish entities
that cared more about their immediate interests than they cared for the
development of Europe.
A year after Nice, one had to recognize that the enthusiasm had lapsed
in Europe. This lapse is a downturn not uncommon in the history of the
European Union. There were periods notably between the mid 1960s and
the late 1970s when the only tangible progress in the European Community
as it was known was the European monetary system introduced by Helmut
Kohl and Valry Giscard d'Estaing in order to create a new dynamism,
indeed a signal economic achievement which eventually led to the
emergence of the Euro.
There are periods in the history of Europe where one feels that "one
step forward, two steps back," is much more characteristic of the
construction of the union than the opposite, as in the continued deadlock of
"unanimity" introduced back in 1966 by the so-called Luxemburg
Compromise when, in the face of the objection of De Gaulle's France, the
EC states agreed that on a matter that anyone considers as of national
interest, only unanimous decisions would be allowed to prevail.'' But that
should not prevent us from looking at Europe as something that has been a
great success in terms of the union of hitherto totally independent and
warring nation states; and a great success within our discussion should be
considered in the terms that made Europe such a sui generis
conglomeration of states with great potential, rather than in the
shortcomings the atmosphere of the Treaty of Nice temporarily suggest.
It is always useful to recall that Europe is a construction in terms of
law, a legal construct which is characterized by a great complexity of legal
texts as well as an accumulation of treaties, with each treaty correcting the
former legal arrangement. This creates an extraordinary maze of legal texts
that citizens of Europe find difficult to maneuver through. Still, there is one
unifying dimension to Europe, which like the US Supreme Court founding• 12 ..
decision, appeared early in 1964 in the decision of the Court of Justice in
"The Luxembourg Accords of 28 and 29 January 1966, Bulletin of the EEC, March 1966
(3-1966), reprinted in JAMES D. DINNAGE AND JOHN F. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 215-16 (1996).
12 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
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Costa. 13 That decision, like Marbury, offered a formidable precondition for
the federalist rights of the states of the European Union by way of making
communitarian law, as it used to be called, to prevail over any national law,
whether that national law is subsequent to or antecedent to the treaty with
which that law may be incompatible.
Costa said that unlike international treaties, the European treaty has
established its own juridical order, which is integrated into the legal
systems of the member states, and which imposes itself on their
jurisdiction. We find application of this founding ruling of the European
Court of Justice in a large number of decisions in an amazing array of
fields, including competition, freedom of movement and establishment, and
immigration. It has also reverberated into the very internal system of case
law within each member nation state. For example, in the 1977 case known
as Simmental, the court held that a national judge who is in charge of
applying, within the framework of his competence, the dispositions of
communitarian law, has the obligation to ensure the full effect of these rules
by leaving, if necessary, unapplied on his own authority any country
disposition of the national legislation. 14 He does not even have to wait for
the elimination of that national disposition by legislative fiat or by any other
constitutional process.15
In other words, a situation developed within the nation-states of
Europe where a law passed in France or in Germany will not stand before a
law passed at the level of the European Union. This is true even if
European Union law has taken the form of a directive, a lower level law-
making tool in Europe. For example, the Cour de Cassation, France's
highest court and the apex of the civil law system in France, cannot issue a
judgment which is contrary to a simple directive passed by the European
Union. Hence, the structure of the extraordinary federalism, which by way
of the court, has established two conditions in the European system. The
first is the presence of a supreme court, the European Court of Justice
("ECJ"), which operates by way of referral, - which limits its sway
somehow, but still by way of a referral that becomes mandatory whenever a
disposition of European law is at stake in the system. The second is the
large array of decisions within each of the fifteen jurisdictions in Europe
establishing the primary dimension of European law even over decisions of
its own national courts.
In some cases, there is a problem with the standing of the constitution
in these countries with regard to the decisions of the European Court of
13 Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica, 1968 E.C.R. 585 (determining
that the European Economic Community treaties established a constitution and treating its
constituent nations within a European system rather than as sovereign entities).
14 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze Dello Stato v. Simmental SpA (It),
1978 E.C.R. 629.
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Justice. But even there, there is no flat denial of the ECJ's writ. This is
best exemplified in the Solange decisions of the German Constitutional
Court, 16 which in recent years has hesitated to deny a place for the German
Constitution over and above European law in one of its most basic
entrenchments - human rights. Despite the German hesitations, the
supremacy of European law and its integration into the system will appear
familiar in terms of federalism under supremacy of the United States
Constitution as interpreted by its Supreme Court since the early days of the
Republic.
With the integration on the judicial level, which can be portrayed as
the most important legal contribution to the rise of federalism in Europe,
one has to dwell also on the development in the legislative field by way of
the concept of 'qualified majority', included openly in the Treaties of
Amsterdam and Nice. Under qualified majority, the states have a number
of voices whenever a decision has to be voted upon, which is a complicated
apportionment of population and political importance in each state for
matters that do not run under the consensual agreement. In other words,
Europe has inched away from unanimity, with complex logistical
arrangements that trump consensual, unanimous decisions by all the
member states, and which operate alongside the slow build-up by the
European Court of Justice of the body of case law that is considered sui
generis, - sui juris indeed as the new constitutional order of Europe. Nor
can one omit the extraordinary achievements by way of the common
currency that is now in place in twelve European countries. All of this is on
the side of the achievements of European federalism.
On the side of problems that are still important in the system, we have
witnessed in the past years a tempestuous debate over what is known in
Europe as the "F word." The concept of federalism itself is hotly debated
within larger discussions on "good governance" and "democratic deficits."
These discussions on governance have their federalist supporters, most
prominent among them is Germany's Foreign Minister. In a speech last
year, he advocated strongly for a system that obviously resembles the
German federal system, a system which takes its titre de noblesse from the
American precedent. The idea is to establish two chambers - one would be
the chamber of citizens voting across the Union and the other would be a
chamber that would represent the member states. The election of the
president would take place with universal suffrage. These
recommendations are being advanced in an active and politically engaged
manner by the Germans against which there are a large array of positions,
and some, like Great Britain's leaders, oppose the very idea of federalism.
Other players who are more engaged in terms of the construction of Europe,
161nternationale Handeslgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fuer Getreide and
Futtermittel (Solange 1) [1974] 2 CMLR 540 (F.R.G.); Case 69/85, Wuensche
Handelsgesellschaft and Co v. Germany (Solange I), 1986 E.C.R. 947.
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like the French, are talking of a more nuanced "federation of nation states"
rather than of a federation along the lines of America as more openly
advocated in Germany: in terms more familiar to comparative jurists and
political scientists when it comes to details, it is easier to defend federalism
along the lines that the American system has developed, if only because it
has such a powerful history behind it, but some of the concepts are hybrid
even in the discussions. For instance, the election of a president of the
Commission by universal suffrage would seems acceptable to the French,
but doing away with the present weighting of votes in favor of straight
majority-rule is not something that would be supported in Paris at this
stage. One can also see the difficulty, in a few years, in having a large
union without an arithmetic mechanism that does away with the
complicated system Nice established.
In addition to these conscious, open debates, over federal issues, one
contribution is typically European. That contribution has developed over
the past ten years under the concept of subsidiarity. Since the Nice Treaty,
the European Community, "in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence .. .shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by
the Community."' 17 This is a complex definition, which can be translated in
more simple terms: if the European Community's objective can be achieved
at a lower level (for instance states, or regions), then there is no reason why
the upper level should intervene and legislate on that subject. Subsidiarity
is an old concept which curiously appears in Papal encyclicals in the 1930s,
but the problem is that there is not a single decision of the European Court
of Justice which adjudicates subsidiarity. As long as there is no illustration
of real conflicts between the lower level which is advocating its
competence over a given field, and the higher level - most probably the
Commission - in that field, the concept of subsidiarity will remain abstract
and withdrawn from the daily life of the citizen as she lives it in European
context.
To conclude this section on the path of European federalism both in its
achievements and in the problems that it conjures up as a society in
progress, perhaps the great contribution of Europe will be to devise not so
much a working definition of subsidiarity - the definition as it stands in the
treaty is good enough - but to offer practical areas in which the concept of
subsidiarity can be adjudicated in a real conflict. A real conflict would not
so much operate between the regions at the lower level and the Commission
in Brussels, an inter-institutional operation which is handled well enough so
far, but in practical problems that would directly engage the citizens. It is
only when we see a citizen or a group of citizens suing in the European
17 Treaty of Rome, as amended, supra note 8, part V, art. 3b.
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Court of Justice in order to vindicate decision-making closer to home for
them, rather than a directive or regulation descending on them from
Brussels, then typically European federalism will have come of age.
III
Let us now examine the area where some creativity is expected on my
part, which is the issue of federalism in the Middle East. We can start with
the following daunting question: why is it that in a region that is obsessed
by unity,(that has been obsessed by unity at least for the past hundred years,
where the concept of the Arab world is one that has been on the lips of
everyone as a necessary passage for reform and strength at the regional
level), why is it that not a single experiment of unity in any shape has
succeeded so far beyond the existing nation states in their arbitrary
boundaries delineated at the turn of the century by the former colonial
powers? This paradox can be put even more forcefully. Why is it if one
looks at this region into the smaller prism of those nation-states that have
been the subjects, or vectors of international relations and of the rule of
their citizens for the past seventy or eighty years, they all appear on the
way, either indirectly or directly, of collapse? Why is it that the open
reality of secession is more prevalent than the structure that has been
inherited from colonial powers?
Examples are plethora: why have there been so many problems
between south and north Yemen? Why is there continuing civil war pitting
the south of Sudan against the north of Sudan for the past thirty years?
Why is it that the Kurdish area north of the 3 6 th parallel is one where the
writ of Baghdad does not hold any sway? Why has Lebanon experienced a
twenty-year civil war between its various regions? Why is the Palestinian
problem so intractable between the very entities that form the historical
Israel-Palestine compound? These question not only address why unions
have not been found in the Middle East, but why even within the nation-
states that have been recognized and defended over the past fifty years, the
system is bursting at the seams. Well again, there would be a number of
explanations for this. One of my preferred ones, bizarre as it might sound, is
that federalism is an invention, a construct that comes by way of education,
and that legal education has never carried it in the area.
The greatest resistance in Europe to the concept of federalism comes
from Britain and France. Neither country, because of historical reasons
relating to their legal systems, has had any experience with federalism.
And because of the fifty-years - on average, France ruled Algeria from
1830 to 1961 - of colonial domination these two countries exclusively
exercised over the Middle East, the word "federalism" was never uttered in
law schools and judicial systems. Put differently, there is no reference in
the Middle East to federalism because the way legal education has been
conducted for the past hundred years has been entrenched in the British and
[Vol. 35:1
FEDERALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
French models, and thus in Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq. Since the
federal horizon did not appear in their textbooks, it is difficult for students,
attorneys, judges or legislators to make a jump into the unknown, a jump
that even the Europeans have difficulty making.
Even in Europe, there are problems along national lines that obtain
from the lack of federal constructs in legal education. The countries that
have experimented with federalism domestically, like Spain since 1978 and
Germany since 1949, find it much easier to utter the word than countries
like France and Britain where the concept has remained alien from their
own legal tradition. Now project this reluctance onto the Middle East
where there is no federal construct, and you have a real intellectual problem
dealing with the word federalism for which there is no affinity because
none of those natural vectors - law students, the judges, the law professors
- have had to grapple with it in law school, let alone in less specialized
fora.
This might sound bizarre, but I think this is one of the major elements
that explain why the Middle East federal experiment is lacking. There is no
recognizable dimension in which the legal profession can identify with
federalism in order to project it on their own selves. And how needed that
is! Let us take the example of Iraq. As you know, Iraq is one of those
typical countries where "national unity" is lacking. National unity is
lacking because of the many dimensions of Iraqi disunity - sociologically
and historically between Arabs and Kurds, and within Arabs, between
Shi'is and Sunnis. About 20% of the population of Iraq lives in a
geographical continuum north of the 3 6th parallel. That region is mainly
inhabited by Kurds, who speak a different language and have a different
"national tradition" than the Arabs who live in Baghdad and south of that
line. But there is also a curious fracture within Iraqi society between Arab
Sunnis and Arab Shi'is. Shi'ism and Sunnism are the two main sects in
Islam, historically somewhat similar to Catholics and Protestants in
Christianity. And the divide is sociologically very heavy in the history of
Iraq. As a result of those fractures, there is no proper accounting of how
the society is exactly divided in terms of population and percentages. But it
is presumed that the Iraqi population is comprised of approximately 60%
Arab Shi'is, 20% Arab Sunnis, and 20% Kurds, mostly Sunnis. One can
see how the three elements are additionally intertwined in terms of
geography, because the line between the north and the south which marks
the so-called 3 6 th parallel operates relatively well to demarcate Arab and
Kurdish Iraqis (and even then, there are quite a few Kurds who live in
Baghdad, and many Kurds are more conversant in educated Arabic than in
Kurdish), the geographical line simply does not work as a demarcation
between Sunnis and Shi'is.
In a situation like this, and however thorny its application in practice,
it is clear that the only model that can offer some sort of respite, some sort
of room for those communities to flourish, is a federalist model. It would
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allow new spaces to be created, both in terms of autonomy and interaction.
But we are fighting one major problem: over the past thousand years, Iraq
has been "unified." In more recent times, the mere thought of federalism
has always appeared as a secessionist ploy either put forward by the Kurds
or put forward by the Shi'is. It is a problem you will still hear now in the
Arab world, that any intervention by America in Iraq is bound to blow it up.
This should not deter us from trying: since 1992, with colleagues in Europe
and the Iraqi opposition, we have been instrumental in putting federalism
forward as a leading concept for the constitutional alternative in Iraq.
Leading figures of the Iraqi opposition, with whom I worked for a long
time, have realized through a slow process of persuasion, that a federal Iraq
must be thought through, and thought through in a creative way that takes
into account the diversity and complexity of populations in Iraqi society.
This is going to be the major problem of the future of Iraq. That is, in
any situation where the central government is overthrown, then the great
problem is going to be how these communities are going to interact. And
this creates yet other problem, which is particularly interesting in the
Middle East in the same way as the concept of subsidiarity may be a major
European addendum to the federal template the American tradition has
offered to the world for the past 200 years. I am referring to what I call, for
lack of a better term, communitarian federalism. Communitarian
federalism is not based on geography. As you know, federalism in all the
states that have practiced it is essentially territorial, geographical. You
identify an area of the country and give it some sort of a fictive boundary.
Within that boundary, you establish the autonomy and the autonomous
institutions that are needed for a federal system to project the voice of the
people within that region in a way that keeps the country together, but gives
much leeway to those nearer the communities within which they live and
interact.
The problem with the Middle East is that while this can accommodate
some countries where a geographical continuum corresponds to a
sociological or historical entity like the Kurds in northern Iraq, the
territorial continuum breaks down when you have divisions along
"personal" matters, hence the weight of the communitarian system. This is
where we find ourselves looking for a model which again, for lack of a
better word, one can call communitarian federalism.
There are experiments in communitarian federalism in at least two
Middle Eastern countries - Israel and Lebanon. In Lebanon it is the most
developed because the whole structure of the state is built along
communitarian lines. To give you a simple example: the president of the
Republic in Lebanon can only be a Christian of the Maronite sect. No other
Lebanese affiliation is entitled to that office. At the same time, the prime
minister can only be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament can
only be a Shi'i Muslim. By dividing up the three most potent positions of
the center of the state - the speakership, the prime ministership and the
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presidency - and secluding them in this communitarian federalism, the
Lebanese system has achieved some sort of a balance.
Israel is different because it is a self-denominated Jewish state. The
Jewish affiliation defines nationality in Israel in more ways than one. Israel
also has a significant non-Jewish Arab minority, and one is not talking
about the West Bank and Gaza. About 20% of the Israeli population is
Arab. In order to accommodate this population, forms of communitarian
federalism have been granted by the Israeli "constitution," actually an un-
written constitution. This operates, for instance, in the field of family law.
That is the most natural law for communitarian federalism to develop,
whereby Muslims have their own courts and decisions of these courts are
implemented by the state. Similarly, the Jews marry not alongside a civil
contract that would be common to their country, but according to a system
that essentially hails from their religious tradition. Similarly, the Christians
have their courts, and the family law ambit is generally one that is diverse
though protected by the state. This is one form of sub-communitarian
recognition that the Israeli constitution has offered in order to accommodate
those differences.
The problem is that the system is not working for things that matter
usually more than marital or filial arrangements, like political decisions.
Even though 20% of the population is Arab - that is, non-Jewish - very
little representation of that 20% appears at the apex of decision-taking in
Israel. Only recently was there an Arab minister in the government, but he
had to resign because of some corruption scheme. In any case, anybody
who knows Israeli society and the way it operates knows that the presence
of this Arab minister was not significant in terms of power.
That brings us finally to the ongoing search for new horizons of
federalism in the Middle East at large. It is important to think along new
models in the area that have to incorporate those two dimensions. First of
all, certainly, federalism, territorial federalism, because it seems to me that
this is the only way to go forward and accommodate the search for
autonomy and self-determination "of identifiable, discrete, and insular18
minorities," to use the language of the U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly,
however, there is an ambit of communitarian federalism which draws
alternative means of integration in some countries. Such communitarian
federalism offers a template that is very typically Middle Eastern, but also
puts the concept of equality before the law in jeopardy. This means that we
would have to find a unique accommodation of both geographical and
communitarian federalism to solve this problem.
In the case of Palestine, such complex but rich arrangement is a much
more interesting model to follow than the one debated within a two-state
solution - not only at the level of the Israeli state within its 1948
boundaries, but also on the more general continuum between Palestine and
18 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288 (1978).
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Israel. I do not believe it is practical to build two-nation states because the
results would prove extremely harsh on whatever minority will remain in
either nation state. What would be built up with walls and legislation - on
the side of Palestine and on the side of Israel - would be harshly exclusive
of anything that is not Jewish within Israel and not Arab in the West Bank
and Gaza. Rather than having those two nation states built up along harsh
demarcation lines, it is far more promising to look into forms of federalism,
both territorial and communitarian, which would allow the conviviality of
those communities in ways the law would regulate, so as to prevent the
building up of walls, real or fictive. This would offer a much richer texture
of societies that does not exclude any of their citizens, any of the people
living on that federal, communitarian and geographical, continuum.
